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INTRODUCTION 
The recent investigations of local police officers for the deaths of unarmed 
civilians in Ferguson, Missouri and Staten Island, New York, fueled public outrage 
about the lack of transparency of grand jury proceedings.1 In Ferguson, St. Louis 
County Prosecutor Robert McCullough took the highly unusual step, after the grand 
jury issued a “no bill,” of releasing portions of grand jury transcripts.2 But during the 
investigation and deliberations themselves, both grand jury proceedings were kept 
secret pursuant to the time-honored and accepted tradition of shielding grand jurors 
from improper influence.3 Even one of the witnesses in the Missouri case hired by 
the victim’s family—pathologist Michael Baden—was prevented from talking to the 
media about the substance of his grand jury testimony during that inquiry.4  
                                                                                                                 
 
 * Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Rappaport Center for Law and Public Policy, 
Boston College Law School. I am grateful to my colleagues Jeffrey Cohen, Judith McMorrow, 
Mary Ann Neary, David Olson, and Robert Ullmann for their invaluable comments, and to my 
students Nathan Roberts (J.D. ’15) and Kathryn Ball (J.D. ’17) for their extremely helpful 
research and editorial assistance. 
 1. Editorial, Michael Brown, Eric Garner: Why Killings by Police Cause Public 
Suspicions, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 2014, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials
/ct-eric-garner-michael-brown-police-kill-edit-1205-jm-20141204-story.html [https://perma
.cc/D7TV-JBFD]; Jennifer Peltz, After Killings by Police, A Debate Over Grand Jury Secrecy, 
DENVER POST (Jan. 28, 2015, 8:23 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/environment
/ci_27409802/?source=infinite-up [https://perma.cc/D9HJ-6MRY]. 
 2. Benjamin Weiser, Mixed Motives Seen in Prosecutor’s Decision to Release Ferguson 
Grand Jury Materials, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11
/26/us/mixed-motives-seen-in-prosecutors-decision-to-release-ferguson-grand-jury-materials.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/9DNK-5955]. 
 3. See Richard M. Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV. 455, 456 (1965). In 
contrast to the Ferguson, Missouri case, a New York Supreme Court justice refused a petition 
by the New York Civil Liberties Union and the NAACP to release grand jury transcripts in 
the investigation into the death of Eric Garner in Staten Island, citing the strong presumption 
in favor of grand jury secrecy and the “chilling effect” that a release of transcripts would have 
on witnesses before such a tribunal. James v. Donovan, 130 A.D.3d 1032, 1039 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2015). For the New York Civil Liberties Union’s arguments, see Brief of 
Petitioner-Appellant at 15–18, James v. Donovan, 130 A.D.3d 1032 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) 
(No. 2015-02774). 
 4. Stephanie Lecci, Grand Jury Hears Testimony from Brown Family Pathologist, ST. 
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Missouri is one of a small number of states that expressly prevent grand jury 
witnesses from disclosing their testimony to the press or to other witnesses.5 But in 
New York, as well as in the majority of other states and the federal system, 
obligations of grand jury secrecy do not extend to grand jury witnesses.6 In these 
jurisdictions, only persons performing an “official function” before the grand jury 
are covered by the oath of secrecy.7 Absent a contract or court order, witnesses are 
free to talk with each other or with the press. Nevertheless, prosecutors often seek to 
handcuff grand jury witnesses in their exercise of First Amendment rights by drafting 
one-sided cooperation agreements or immunity orders that impose obligations of 
secrecy on grand jury witnesses, even though none exist under governing statutes or 
rules of criminal procedure. 
This Article addresses one crucial aspect of the ongoing debate about grand jury 
transparency.8 Assuming that well over half the states and the federal government 
                                                                                                                 
 
LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Nov. 13, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/grand-jury-hears
-testimony-brown-family-pathologist [https://perma.cc/AQ55-UURR]. 
 5. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 540.110 (West 2002) (providing that the foreperson shall be 
authorized to administer the following oath to every witness that appears before the grand jury: 
“Do you further solemnly swear, or affirm, that you will not after your examination here, 
directly or indirectly, divulge or make known to any person or persons the fact that this grand 
jury has or has had under consideration the matters concerning which you shall be examined, 
or any other fact or thing which may come to your knowledge while before this body, or 
concerning which you shall here testify, unless lawfully required to testify in relation 
thereto?”). See also SARA SUN BEALE, WILLIAM C. BRYSON, JAMES E. FELMAN, MICHAEL J. 
ELSTON & KATHERINE EARLE YANES, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.5, Westlaw 
(database updated Nov. 2015) (describing twelve states impose obligation of secrecy on grand 
jury witnesses).  
 6. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5 n.23. While twelve states include witnesses 
before the grand jury in the obligation of secrecy, most states that do so typically provide an 
express exception for communications between the witness and their counsel. Id. § 5.5 n.22. 
See infra note 64 and accompanying text.  
 7. Traditional justifications for grand jury secrecy include protecting the witnesses or 
jurors from intimidation, safeguarding the putative target from injury to reputation should he 
not be indicted, and preventing flight, obstruction of justice, or the subornation of perjury. 
United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983). 
 8. See, e.g., Paul Cassell, Achieving Transparency for the Grand Jury’s Decision on the 
Michael Brown Shooting, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 19, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/11/19/achieving-transparency
-for-the-grand-jurys-decision-on-the-michael-brown-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/63YC-K6F6]; 
Chris Dolmetsch, N.Y. Police Evidence Request Furthers Grand Jury Debate, BLOOMBERG 
BUS.  (Dec. 12, 2014, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12
-12/grand-jury-evidence-in-nypd-killing-sought-by-official [https://perma.cc/A32K-TA53]; 
Kristine Guerra & Jill Disis, Was Shooting Self-Defense or Manslaughter? Case Reflects 
Debate over Grand Juries, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Jan. 2, 2015, 11:12 AM), 
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/crime/2015/01/02/self-defense-shooting-case-illustrates
-debate-grand-juries/21102797/ [https://perma.cc/LNT3-HLUW]; Peltz, supra note 1; R.W., 
How a Grand Jury Works, THE ECONOMIST: THE ECONOMIST EXPLAINS (Dec. 7, 2014, 11:50 
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/12/economist-explains-3 
[https://perma.cc/FTR3-3ABF]. 
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continue to employ the grand jury to investigate felony offenses, 9 and assuming that 
these proceedings continue to be shielded from public view,10 should witnesses 
themselves be allowed to discuss their testimony with the press or with each other? 
This larger question raises two narrow but very important subsidiary issues. First, 
does a prosecutor who conditions a written proffer or cooperation agreement with a 
grand jury witness on the witness’s promise not to inform other targets, subjects, or 
witnesses about what information he provided to the government violate Model Rule 
of Professional Conduct 3.4(f)11 by impeding another party’s access to information 
in litigation? Second, does a judge who issues a grant of judicial immunity under 18 
U.S.C. § 600312 or its state analogue and includes an order prohibiting the grand jury 
witness from talking to any other potential witnesses or to the media about the subject 
matter of the government’s investigation exceed his or her authority under Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)?13 Both of these scenarios implicate not only the 
public interest in being informed about governmental affairs, but also the ability of 
putative targets of an investigation to work together to gather, preserve, and submit 
potentially exculpatory information that may help influence the grand jury not to 
indict, or to indict for a lesser offense. In this Article, I will argue that efforts by 
prosecutors and judges to impose extrastatutory secrecy obligations on grand jury 
witnesses undermine the independence of the grand jury, and thwart its proper 
screening function.14 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 5, § 1.7. Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia 
continue to use grand juries, although these jurisdictions differ in exactly how they are utilized. 
In nineteen states grand jury indictment is required for all felonies, in four states it is required 
only for particularly serious named felonies such as murder, and in twenty-five states (so called 
“information” states) the prosecutor may elect to charge by either grand jury indictment or 
information. See Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy 
in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 19 & nn.85–87 (2002). Connecticut has 
abandoned the use of the grand jury altogether for criminal cases, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 54-47(b)–(e) (2009), and in Pennsylvania the government may only petition the court to 
convene a grand jury in special circumstances. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4543 (West 
2004).  
 10. Calkins, supra note 3, at 458–59; see Editorial, A Judge’s Idea for Grand Jury Reform, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/opinion/a-judges-idea-for
-grand-jury-reform.html?_r=2 [https://perma.cc/WNA3-GHVZ]; James Queally, Grand 
Juries Are ‘Relic of Another Time’: New York’s Top Judge Urges Reform, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
17, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-ny-grand-jury-reform-20150217
-story.html [https://perma.cc/LYE9-NVFA]. 
 11. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (1983). 
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (2012). 
 13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). 
 14. See generally United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 430 (1983) (describing 
the relationship between prosecutor and grand jury); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686–88 
(1972) (describing the purposes and powers of a grand jury). 
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I. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM 
It is generally conceded that at the grand jury phase of a criminal proceeding, the 
prosecutor is the writer, director, producer, and star of her own show.15 Prosecutors 
try to control the flow of information to and from the grand jury in order to reduce 
the risk of target flight, witness tampering, and the destruction of evidence. These 
are legitimate concerns that are reflected in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
pertaining to grand jury secrecy.16 Yet “secrecy” is sometimes an overstated, if not 
talismanic, justification for excessive prosecutorial control. Prosecutors routinely try 
to inhibit the dissemination of information about the grand jury’s inquiry because it 
gives them the tactical advantage of surprise when examining witnesses, it 
contributes to the power of the prosecutor to catch witnesses in the “perjury trap” 
and thereby secure their cooperation,17 and it makes it difficult for witnesses who 
share common interests to work together to prepare their defense.  
In Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest,18 the Supreme Court identified five 
specific interests advanced by keeping grand jury proceedings secret. 
First, if preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective 
witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that 
those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony. 
Moreover, witnesses who appeared before the grand jury would be less 
likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open to retribution as 
well as to inducements. There also would be the risk that those about to 
be indicted would flee, or would try to influence individual grand jurors 
to vote against indictment. Finally, by preserving the secrecy of the 
proceedings, we assure that persons who are accused but exonerated by 
the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.19  
The Court ruled that civil litigants seeking to gain access to the transcripts of grand 
jury proceedings in related criminal litigation must show a particularized need for 
disclosure that outweighs these strong public interests.20  
In most jurisdictions, witnesses are not persons who perform an “official 
function” before the grand jury, and therefore, they are under no express obligation 
to maintain confidentiality under applicable statutes or rules of criminal procedure.21 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. See Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2004); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) 
Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 305 (1995). 
 16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B) (“Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following 
persons must not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury . . . .”). 
 17. Jessica Fischweicher, Perjury, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 799, 820 (2008). 
 18. 441 U.S. 211 (1979). 
 19. Id. at 219. 
 20. Id. at 223–24. 
 21. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); BEALE, ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5. For example, in 
the Eric Garner death investigation in Staten Island, the man who took the now infamous video 
of the police placing a chokehold on the victim spoke at memorials, vigils, and other public 
events after Garner’s death. Estevan Bassett-Nembhard, Remembering Eric Garner, African 
American Father of Six, PEOPLE’S WORLD (July 31, 2014), http://www.peoplesworld.org
2016] SILENCING GRAND JURY WITNESSES 827 
 
A witness may have legal interests that prompt him to discuss with others what 
occurred in the grand jury room (such as where the government is investigating joint 
conduct among associates), he may have economic or personal interests that motivate 
him to share what transpired (such as with an employer or a loved one), or he may 
have a motive to disseminate his story to the media in order to influence debate about 
public affairs. Nonetheless, prosecutors often try to curtail these free speech rights. 
This Article examines whether such prosecutorial control is a form of overreaching 
that impedes the legitimate function of the grand jury, by isolating and insulating the 
grand jury from potentially exculpatory information that might be forthcoming if 
grand jury witnesses were allowed more freedom to share their stories with others. 
The issue of whether a grand jury witness can be “gagged” may arise in a number 
of contexts. The prosecutor may issue a letter to the witness accompanying a grand 
jury subpoena exhorting the witness not to reveal to anyone else that they have 
received the subpoena or not to discuss the subject of the investigation.22 The 
prosecutor may orally instruct the witness outside or inside the grand jury room that 
they may not discuss their testimony with others.23 The prosecutor may draft a proffer 
letter or cooperation agreement that contains obligations of secrecy on the part of the 
witness.24 Or, the prosecutor may ask a court to impose such a restriction when the 
                                                                                                                 
 
/remembering-eric-garner-african-american-father-of-six/ [https://perma.cc/BE8Z-VWC9]; 
Funeral Held for Man Who Died in NY Police Custody, YAHOO NEWS (July 23, 2014), 
http://news.yahoo.com/funeral-held-man-died-ny-police-custody-000218940.html [https://perma.cc
/C8YU-J8VR]. After the grand jury returned a no-bill against the officers, Ramsey Orta once 
again made a statement to the media, saying that the grand jury proceeding “wasn’t fair from 
the start” and the jurors were not “even paying attention.” “It was bullshit,” Mr. Orta claimed. 
Erik Badia, Tina Moore & Corky Siemaszko, Man Who Filmed Eric Garner in Chokehold 
Says Grand Jury Was Rigged, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 5, 2014, 5:02 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/eric-garner-grand-jury-rigged-man-filmed-chokehold
-article-1.2033257 [https://perma.cc/X764-UBJA]. 
 22. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5 (noting that although it is now widely understood 
that it is improper for a federal prosecutor to advise grand jury witnesses that they may not 
disclose the substance of their testimony to others, “the practice [still] lingers.”). Compare 
United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that the prosecutor did 
not violate Rule (6)(e) or the Due Process Clause by sending the grand jury a subpoena with a 
cover letter requesting the witness not to disclose the existence or the content of the subpoena), 
with In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 61, 68–70 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding that a letter 
instructing witnesses not to disclose the existence of a subpoena or the fact that they had 
complied with the subpoena for a period of ninety days impermissibly conveyed that witnesses 
were obliged to remain silent).  
 23. SUSAN W. BRENNER & LORI E. SHAW, 2 FEDERAL GRAND JURY: A GUIDE TO LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 16.10, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2014). See United States v. Clemones, 
577 F.2d 1247, 1251 (5th Cir. 1978) (describing an instance where a magistrate issued an order 
that the prosecutor must reinstruct grand jury witnesses); In re Proceedings Before the Grand 
Jury Summoned October 12, 1970, 321 F. Supp. 238, 240–41 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (granting a 
motion restraining the prosecutor from instructing grand jury witnesses that they must report 
back to the prosecutor’s office if any party interrogated them about what questions they were 
asked in the grand jury).  
 24. See JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 2.24 (4th ed. 2008) 
(lamenting that prosecutors still persist in attempting to seal the lips of witnesses despite the 
language in Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). See also United States v. 
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prosecutor brings a motion before the court to immunize the witness and/or compel 
his testimony.25 The first two situations present examples of soft intimidation that 
may be difficult to detect and control.26 The latter two examples—what I shall call 
formal but “extrastatutory” secrecy obligations—are the subject of this Article.  
As a way to illustrate the complexity of this issue and the situations in which it 
may arise, consider the following two hypotheticals.  
Hypothetical one. An employee of a major pharmaceutical company is 
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury investigating health care fraud. Represented 
by counsel, the employee asserts his Fifth Amendment right before the grand jury 
and declines to testify. The prosecutor wishes to entertain a “proffer” from the 
witness, under which the witness will give a complete and candid disclosure of all 
relevant information known to him in exchange for the government’s promise not to 
                                                                                                                 
 
Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 569–71 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 561 U.S. 358 
(2010) (involving Enron defendant alleging that the prosecution impeded access to witnesses 
in the manner in which it drafted cooperation agreements; the court of appeals affirmed 
judgment of conviction on the grounds that the district court remedied any potential prejudice 
by writing all witnesses a letter prior to trial explaining that they were not limited in what 
information they shared with defense); United States v. Salcedo-Smith, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 
1091–92 (W.D. Mo. 2006) (denying motion to prohibit the government from sending proffer 
agreements that required the suspect to keep content of the proffer interview confidential and 
not disclose it to any nongovernment representative without approval of an Assistant U.S. 
Attorney). It is difficult to ascertain how frequently federal and state prosecutors include 
secrecy provisions in their cooperation agreements because such letters are not public 
documents unless and until there is a trial on the merits, the witness testifies, and a copy of the 
agreement is introduced into evidence. The author is personally aware of instances in the 
District of Massachusetts where prosecutors presented defense attorneys with draft 
cooperation agreements that contained secrecy obligations. Moreover, the U.S. Attorneys’ 
Manual encourages prosecutors to be aggressive about protecting the secrecy of grand jury 
proceedings. For example, section 9-11.142 provides that every financial institution that is 
served with a subpoena for financial records should be advised that civil and criminal penalties 
exist in certain circumstances for notifying their account holders of the receipt or content of 
that subpoena. OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-11.142 (1997). The relevance of the Financial Privacy Act to grand 
jury secrecy will be discussed infra Part III.  
 25. BRENNER & SHAW, supra note 23, § 16.10. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 
F.3d 18, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (granting the government’s motion to compel grand jury testimony 
over a claim of privilege and including order of nondisclosure). It is difficult to determine 
exactly how often gag orders are sought in the immunity application context because immunity 
applications and judicial immunity orders are typically placed under seal. See, e.g., Lugosch 
v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 112–13 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Smith, 
985 F. Supp. 2d 506, 517–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re Antitrust Grand Jury Investigation, 508 
F. Supp. 397, 397 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
 26. I am not conceding that a prosecutor’s instructions to a witness (orally or by letter) 
not to talk to others about the content of their testimony is a benign practice. Especially if the 
witness is not represented by counsel, he or she may interpret the instruction “please keep the 
contents of this subpoena and your testimony thereunder confidential because there are 
criminal consequences for obstruction of justice” as an authoritative command rather than a 
request.  
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use this information against the witness.27 The prosecutor includes language in the 
proffer agreement whereby the witness agrees not to tell his employer or anyone else 
in the company what questions the government asked or what information the 
witness provided during the proffer session. After obtaining such a proffer and 
interviewing the witness, the prosecutor determines that the government would like 
to secure the witness’s testimony before the grand jury notwithstanding the witness’s 
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. The prosecutor then enters into a 
nonprosecution agreement with the witness, whereby the witness agrees to cooperate 
with the government and testify in the grand jury and at any future proceedings, in 
exchange for an agreement by the government not to prosecute him. Again, the 
prosecutor includes in this written nonprosecution agreement a promise by the 
witness not to talk with others about the content of his testimony during the pendency 
of the grand jury proceeding.  
Hypothetical two. A United States senator approaches authorities with a claim that 
he is being extorted. According to the purported victim, he fathered a child with a 
woman with whom he was having an extramarital relationship, and he has been 
secretly supporting that child for the past three years. Recently the senator was 
contacted by the woman’s current boyfriend, a body builder and personal trainer, and 
threatened with public exposure and physical violence unless he pays the boyfriend 
$1 million. The senator is represented by counsel. Prosecutors begin a grand jury 
investigation into the allegation of extortion and threats on a public official. They 
subpoena the alleged mother of the senator’s child to testify before the grand jury. 
The woman asserts her Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. The 
prosecutor petitions a judge to issue an immunity order under 18 U.S.C. § 6003.28 
Under pressure from the senator’s lawyer, who wishes to shield his client from 
embarrassing publicity for as long as possible, the prosecutor requests that the judge 
considering the immunity application also issue a “gag order” on the witness, 
preventing her from disclosing to the media or to any third parties information that 
is the subject of the grand jury inquiry for the duration of the investigation.  
In both of the above scenarios, an agent of the state is imposing an obligation of 
secrecy on a witness before the grand jury. In jurisdictions that have a rule of criminal 
procedure that defines the parameters of grand jury secrecy and excludes grand jury 
witnesses, the question is whether some other source of authority allows the 
prosecutor (in hypothetical one) or the court (in hypothetical two) to prevent the 
witness from releasing information. Or, stated another way, are prosecutors and 
courts simply “going rogue” when they impose secrecy obligations on witnesses 
beyond those expressly contemplated by the applicable rules of criminal procedure? 
In Part II below I will analyze the professional responsibility of prosecutors, and in 
Part III I will address the scope and limits of judicial authority.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. See Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and 
Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 15 (2003); Benjamin A. Naftalis, Note, “Queen for a Day” 
Agreements and the Proper Scope of Permissible Waiver of the Federal Plea-Statement Rules, 
37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 1 (2003). 
 28. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (2012). 
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II. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.4(f) 
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(f) prohibits a lawyer from 
requesting a person “other than a client” to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant 
information “to another party” except in certain limited situations of interest 
alignment (such as where the witness is an employee or relative of the lawyer’s 
client).29 As will be discussed below, the purpose of the rule is to prevent advocates 
from blocking an opponent’s access to information. Whether a prosecutor violates 
Rule 3.4(f)30 when she conditions a proffer or nonprosecution agreement on a grand 
jury witness’s willingness to refrain from talking to other persons about information 
they provided to the government depends upon a proper construction of the term 
“another party.” Does the term “party” in Rule 3.4(f) mean a party to ongoing 
litigation (the narrower sense of the term) or does it mean a person, group or entity 
(the broader sense of the term)? If the former meaning applies, requesting a witness 
not to talk to a potential target of a grand jury investigation does not violate the 
attorney disciplinary rule because prior to indictment the target is not yet a formal 
“party” to litigation. If the latter meaning applies, requesting a grand jury witness not 
to talk to other persons or entities about their testimony violates the rule.  
Rule 3.4(f) first appeared as part of the Kutak Commission Report in 1981 and 
was adopted by the ABA in 1983. It had no direct analogue in the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility. DR 7-109(B) in the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility contained a much narrower provision that only prohibited a lawyer 
from causing “a person to secrete himself or to leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal for 
the purpose of making him unavailable as a witness therein.”31 The 1983 version of 
the disciplinary rule is significantly broader because it prevents a lawyer from asking 
someone not closely related to a client “to refrain from giving relevant information 
to another party.”32 The Kutak Commission Report was imprecise about the new 
rule’s intended breadth, although its purpose clearly was to promote the free flow of 
information during case preparation.33  
Several state ethics boards have ruled that it is improper under Rule 3.4(f) for a 
prosecutor to request victims or witnesses not to talk to the defendant, his counsel, 
or an investigator working on the defendant’s case after charges have been 
commenced.34 Such conduct obviously impedes the defendant’s ability to gather 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (1983). 
 30. Under the McDade Amendment, federal prosecutors are obliged to follow the rules of 
professional responsibility in effect in the states where they conduct their activities. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 530B (2012). 
 31. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(B) (1980). 
 32. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (1983). 
 33. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 1 (1983) (“The procedure of the 
adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshalled competitively 
by the contending parties.”). 
 34. See State Bar of Mich., Informal Ethics Op. RI-302 (1997) (stating that it is improper 
for a prosecutor to advise complaining witness not to talk to a defense lawyer, interpreting 
Rule 3.4(f)); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 
98-134 (1999) (same, interpreting state variation of Rule 3.4(d)); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory 
Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 99-14 (1999) (stating that a city solicitor and part-time 
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evidence to mount a defense. “Another party” in Rule 3.4(f) should also be 
interpreted to include the putative target or targets of a grand jury investigation, who 
the prosecutor has reason to know may be indicted in the future. This interpretation 
is consistent with the construction of the rule, its purpose, and its history.  
The starting point for an analysis of Rule 3.4(f) must be ABA Ethics Opinion 131 
(1935), cited as a leading authority for the prohibition against asking a witness to 
secrete himself or herself in the 1969 Model Code.35 In Opinion 131, the Committee 
on Professional Ethics took the view that it is improper for an attorney to influence 
persons other than clients or employees to refuse to give information to opposing 
counsel.36 In a widely quoted and influential section of this opinion, the committee 
stated: “All persons who know anything about the facts in controversy are, in simple 
truth, the law’s witnesses. They are the human instrumentalities through which the 
law, and its ministers, the judges and the lawyers, endeavor to ascertain truth, and to 
award justice to the contending parties.”37  
The committee grounded its analysis in part on the obligation for a lawyer’s 
conduct “before the [c]ourt and with other lawyers [to] be characterized by candor 
and fairness.”38 There is language in the opinion that suggests its proscription applies 
to both pending and contemplated litigation: “No lawyer should endeavor in any 
way, directly or indirectly, to prevent the truth from being presented to the court in 
the event litigation arises.”39  
This interpretation of Rule 3.4(f) is also consistent with the Rule’s structure. The 
title of the Rule is “Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel.” In the section of the 
rule dealing with pretrial discovery, drafters prohibited “mak[ing] a frivolous 
discovery request or fail[ing] to make reasonably diligent effort[s] to comply with a 
legally proper discovery request by an opposing party.”40 The drafters clearly knew 
how to use the term “opposing party” when they meant to limit the prohibition to 
ongoing litigation, yet they chose to use the term “another party” in section (a) of the 
rule (pertaining to access to evidence) and section (f) (pertaining to access to 
witnesses). It is reasonable to conclude from this construction that the “parties” 
contemplated by the latter two sections include both current litigants and future 
persons or entities whose legal positions are likely to become adverse. Indeed, 
                                                                                                                 
 
prosecutor could not advise a municipal public safety officer not to speak to defense attorneys 
in criminal cases, interpreting Rule 3.4(f)); see also Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 
188–89 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (reversing murder and robbery conviction for prosecutorial 
misconduct; among other grounds, prosecutor deprived defendant of due process by advising 
witnesses not to speak to defense counsel unless prosecutor was present); David S. Caudill, 
Professional Deregulation of Prosecutors: Defense Contact with Victims, Survivors, and 
Witnesses in the Era of Victim’s Rights, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 105 (2003). 
 35. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-27 & n.45 (1980).  
 36. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 131 (1935) (stating that 
where an attorney influences persons other than his clients and their employees to refuse to 
give information which may be useful to opposing counsel he violates the principles in Canons 
15, 22, 32, 39).  
 37. Id. 
 38. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 22 (1908) (emphasis added).  
 39. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 131 (1935) (emphasis added). 
 40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(d) (1983). 
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comment 2 to Rule 3.4 implicitly supports this construction. In support of the 
adoption of the new rule, comment 2 acknowledges that “[a]pplicable law in many 
jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its 
availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen.”41  
Rule 3.4(f) reflects the principle that attorneys for both current and prospective 
litigants should be able to conduct interviews with witnesses free of adversarial 
interference.42 The purpose of the rule is to allow both sides of a potential dispute to 
gather evidence that may be useful in asserting or defending a cause. “Witnesses are 
free agents and may decline to be interviewed, but adversary interference with a 
witness’s decision whether or not to cooperate undermines the principles of fair 
competition on which the system depends.”43 When a prosecutor tells a cooperating 
witness not to talk to potential targets of the investigation about their grand jury 
testimony (for example, in the corporate context, the witness’s employer or fellow 
employees—as in hypothetical one above), she is impeding the ability of that target 
to gather evidence. Information about what line of inquiry the prosecutor is pursuing 
and what facts may be relevant to that inquiry could help the target find and preserve 
documentary evidence and locate other witnesses who may have knowledge of 
pertinent facts.  
Advising witnesses not to talk to the “other side” impedes fact collection in the 
preliminary hearing context as much as it does in the trial context. In this regard, 
grand jury proceedings should be treated no differently than probable cause hearings, 
which occur after the initiation of formal charges but perform much the same 
function. What a prosecutor could not do in the latter instance, she should not be 
allowed to do in the former instance. Grand jury investigations already give 
prosecutors a huge head start in collecting evidence, locking in witnesses under oath, 
and preparing for trial. Including a “gag” provision in a cooperation agreement 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 2 (1983) (emphasis added).  
 42. Jon Bauer, Buying Witness Silence: Evidence-Suppressing Settlements and Lawyers’ 
Ethics, 87 OR. L. REV. 481, 532–33 (2008). Professor Bauer argues that a lawyer’s drafting 
of— or recommendation to his client that the client execute—a civil settlement agreement that 
prohibits the plaintiff from sharing information with future litigants violates Rule 3.4(f). 
Analyzing the history and purpose of the rule, Bauer concludes that at least in the civil context, 
the term “another party” in 3.4(f) should mean a person who has an interest in the dispute or 
transaction or a potential future claim, regardless of whether the lawsuit has yet been filed. Id. 
at 551. 
 43. Id. at 532. Interestingly, the aspirational and nonbinding Prosecution Standards issued 
by the American Bar Association phrase this principle in slightly different terms, albeit ones 
that support my argument that the prohibition on obstructing access to witnesses should apply 
prior to indictment. Standard 3-3.4(h) now states that “[t]he prosecutor should not advise any 
person, or cause any person to be advised, to decline to provide defense counsel with 
information which such person has a right to give.” STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION, § 3-3.4(h) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1992) (emphasis 
added). Because this standard uses the term “defense counsel” rather than “another party,” the 
possible ambiguity of whether it applies prior to the initiation of formal litigation is avoided. 
Where a defense attorney has notified the prosecutor that he represents a target or subject of 
the grand jury investigation, and the prosecutor is aware that there is a lawyer involved in the 
case who may seek to interview witnesses, drafting a cooperation agreement that contains 
broad secrecy provisions clearly violates this standard.  
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further exacerbates this advantage because it handcuffs the target of the investigation 
from talking to witnesses who may help the target understand the nature of the 
allegations and begin to shape a defense.  
In an analogous context, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that it is 
unethical conduct for a defense attorney representing the subject of a grand jury 
investigation to recommend that a nonclient witness decline to cooperate with 
investigating authorities.44 Even though this conduct occurred prior to charging, the 
court ruled that an attempt by the defense counsel to block the government’s access 
to witnesses violated a state disciplinary rule.45 Fair play and adversarial balance 
certainly suggest that if a defense attorney may not obstruct the government’s access 
to witnesses during a grand jury investigation, the prosecutor may not engage in 
similar behavior.  
Perhaps the most compelling argument that might be advanced for allowing a 
prosecutor to condition a proffer or nonprosecution agreement on the grand jury 
witness’s promise not to discuss his testimony with others is that such a provision 
might help prevent targets from fleeing, destroying physical evidence, and 
intimidating other witnesses. One response to this argument is that in those majority 
jurisdictions that exempt witnesses from the obligation of grand jury secrecy in their 
rules of criminal procedure,46 the legislature has already balanced the competing 
interests of public safety and freedom of expression, and has come down on the side 
of the latter.47 Moreover, criminal penalties exist in most jurisdictions for perjury, 
intimidation of witnesses, and obstruction of justice.48 A witness who is not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. In re Blatt, 324 A.2d 15, 18 (N.J. 1974) (suspending a defense attorney for two years, 
and resting the decision on “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice” provisions of 
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(5) (1971)). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 47. See King v. Jones, 319 F. Supp. 653, 657 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (involving Kent State 
grand jury witnesses who sought a federal injunction vacating a state common pleas court 
order that prohibited them from talking to the media; the federal court entered an injunction 
restraining the state defendants from enforcing that order because the Ohio legislature had 
already made a determination that no such restraint was required of witnesses before grand 
jury), rev’d and vacated on other grounds, 450 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1971). 
 48. See John F. Decker, The Varying Parameters of Obstruction of Justice in American 
Criminal Law, 65 LA. L. REV. 49, 77–90 (2004) (reviewing federal and state legislation); see 
also Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 633–36 (1990) (striking down a Florida statute that 
made it a crime for a grand jury witness to ever divulge his testimony; the Court noted that the 
state had enacted substantial criminal penalties for both perjury and tampering with witnesses, 
and therefore “the additional effect of the ban here in question is marginal at best and 
insufficient to outweigh the First Amendment interest in speech involved”). A recent 
high-profile example of an effective obstruction prosecution is the government’s decision to 
charge three college classmates of Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev with the 
crime of obstruction of justice for, among other conduct, removing their friend’s backpack 
from his dorm room and throwing it in a landfill. Two of the three classmates pleaded guilty 
and one was convicted after trial. See Denise Lavoie, Boston Marathon Bomber’s College 
Friends Face Sentencing, CBS BOS. (June 1, 2015, 7:20 PM), http://boston.cbslocal.com/2015
/06/01/boston-marathon-bombers-college-friends-face-sentencing/ [https://perma.cc/QU5G
-HC3U]; Patricia Wen, Jurors Convict Friend of Tsarnaev, BOS. GLOBE (July 21, 2014), 
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dissuaded by criminal penalties from assisting a target to obstruct a grand jury 
investigation will not be dissuaded by the terms of a contractual agreement. And 
since the target is not bound by the cooperation agreement in any event, contractual 
secrecy provisions add little to the government’s ability to detect and prosecute a 
target’s corruption of the grand jury’s truth-finding function. 49  
Another reason prosecutors may sometimes overreach and attempt to “gag” grand 
jury witnesses is that they are attempting to protect their own work product.50 A 
witness can often piece together the government’s theory of its case from the 
questions asked and the documents referenced in the grand jury room. If witnesses 
are allowed to reveal to targets what occurred before the grand jury, the target will 
get an advance preview of the government’s case. However, the attorney 
work-product doctrine cannot justify prosecutors seeking to silence grand jury 
witnesses. The Supreme Court has recognized that the work-product doctrine applies 
to criminal as well as civil cases.51 This qualified privilege is now reflected in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.52 Yet both the common law and statutory 
privileges protect against disclosure of documents and tangible things prepared by a 
lawyer or her agent in anticipation of litigation.53 A witness’s independent 
recollection of what questions the prosecutor orally asked him in front of the grand 
jury simply are not protected by the work-product rule.54 
                                                                                                                 
 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/07/21/jury-resumes-deliberations-trial-azamat
-tazhayakov-friend-boston-marathon-bombing-suspect-dzhokhar-tsarnaev/6H1OxaskP38B3v15ryzvPJ
/story.html [https://perma.cc/97NG-6W6N]; Patricia Wen, Tsarnaev Friend to Plead Guilty 
in Obstruction Case, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro
/2014/08/20/tsarnaev-friend-dias-kadyrbayev-expected-plead-guilty-obstruction-charges
/YgZBn7NGFRX8iigKKBQO1L/story.html [https://perma.cc/AE9D-JYN3].  
 49. Prosecutors would likely argue that without contractual secrecy obligations in 
cooperation agreements, a witness may inform a target of the fact and content of their 
testimony without an intent to obstruct justice (such as out of familial loyalty or business 
relationship), and then the target may thereafter flee or destroy evidence. That is perhaps the 
most compelling argument that can be advanced in favor of imposing a secrecy obligation on 
witnesses. But, as the majority of jurisdictions have recognized in their decision to exclude 
witnesses from any oath of secrecy, this risk is outweighed by the free speech rights of the 
witness and by the target’s right to honestly gather evidence in his defense.  
 50. United States v. Salcedo-Smith, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1091–93 (W.D. Mo. 2006) 
(discussing the government’s argument that the standard proffer agreement was justified to 
protect attorney work product; the court found no due process violation without addressing 
this work product argument).  
 51. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238–40 (1975) (holding that while the 
work-product doctrine applies in criminal cases, respondent waived that privilege when he 
elected to present his investigator as a witness).  
 52. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2), (b)(2). 
 53. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (protecting documents, objects, recordings, and reports); 
Nobles, 422 U.S. at 237–38 (describing the contours of work-product); Hickman v. Taylor, 
329 U.S. 495, 509–12 (1947) (same); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 54. The Supreme Court ruled in Goldberg v. United States that a prosecutor’s notes of a 
witness interview otherwise producible as a witness statement under the Jencks Act were not 
protected by the work-product doctrine. 425 U.S. 94, 108 (1976). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 
16(a)(2). If a prosecutor’s notes of a witness interview are sometimes discoverable 
notwithstanding the work-product rule, the witness’s independent recollection of their own 
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Fears of obstruction of justice and work-product revelation are spurious 
justifications for the practice of including secrecy provisions in proffer and 
cooperation agreements. Returning to hypothetical one above, in most jurisdictions 
the pharmaceutical employee has every right to talk to his employer about what 
questions were asked of him by the government and what information he provided 
in the grand jury room. Indeed, such discussions could enable the company to 
marshal evidence that will be useful to the grand jury’s investigation by interviewing 
other employees with knowledge of the situation, locating and scrutinizing pertinent 
documents, and providing such information and analysis to the government.55 The 
employee/witness may choose for tactical, economic, or personal reasons not to 
discuss his testimony with company management, but the government should not be 
allowed to put its thumb on the scale of this decision in the way that it drafts 
cooperation agreements.56  
Prosecutors undoubtedly will argue that “gag provisions” are part of the legitimate 
give and take of plea bargaining; if cooperating witnesses are willing to agree to 
them, the law should not stand in the way of obligations freely undertaken in 
exchange for charging or sentencing considerations. But such a contract analysis 
misconstrues the purposes and reach of Rule 3.4(f), which is an ethical obligation of 
attorneys. State prosecutors and the Department of Justice lost a similar argument in 
the 1990s, when they tried to argue that the “no-contact” provisions of Model Rule 
                                                                                                                 
 
interview with the prosecutor certainly cannot be protected.  
 55. Jeffery B. Coopersmith & Rachel Herd, If I Can’t Be in the Grand Jury Room, Maybe 
My PowerPoint Can: Revisiting the Government’s Duty To Present Exculpatory Evidence to 
the Grand Jury, THE CHAMPION, Sept. 2014, at 36, 37–38 (encouraging defense attorneys to 
prepare and bring exculpatory information to the attention of federal prosecutors and demand 
that they fulfill their duty under the U.S. Attorney’s Manual to alert the grand jury). 
 56. In my hypothetical, the lawyer for the employee and the lawyer(s) for the company 
may have entered into a “joint defense agreement.” The subject of joint defense agreements is 
beyond the scope of this Article. Typically, a joint defense agreement allows the parties thereto 
to share information with each other in confidence while retaining the right to argue that the 
attorney-client privilege protects intragroup communications in furtherance of a joint legal 
strategy. See United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243–44 (2d Cir. 1989); United States 
v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1989). See 
generally Deborah Stavile Bartel, Reconceptualizing the Joint Defense Doctrine, 65 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 871 (1996) (discussing joint defense agreements and arguing they should be 
recognized independent of work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege). In the 
criminal context, a typical joint defense agreement contains a clause obligating a party to 
withdraw from that agreement and notify the other parties thereto if and when they begin to 
cooperate with the government. Patrick J. Sharkey, Unwrapping the Mystery of Joint Defense 
Agreements, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING AND 
STRATEGIES 181 (2008), Westlaw SN084. Prosecutors justifiably are concerned in the proffer 
context that, notwithstanding such mandatory withdrawal, a lawyer for a cooperating witness 
may share information about the questions asked during the proffer interview with lawyers 
representing other employees of the company or company management. I would argue that 
the protections against sharing client confidences under ABA Model Rule 1.6(a) and state 
variations thereto already safeguard against such behavior by criminal defense attorneys once 
they have withdrawn from a joint defense agreement. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.6(a) (2003). 
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4.257 should not impede a prosecutor’s investigative ability to debrief a represented 
defendant who wished to speak to the government without his counsel present.58 The 
argument that suspects could “waive” Rule 4.2 misconstrued the purpose of the 
no-contact rule, which was to impose an obligation on counsel not to undertake 
action that could drive a wedge between a client and his attorney. “The rule against 
communicating with represented parties is fundamentally concerned with the duties 
of an attorney, not with the rights of the parties.”59 Similarly, the argument that a 
criminal suspect or witness may lawfully agree to a gag provision in a cooperation 
agreement misconstrues the purpose of Rule 3.4(f), which is to prevent lawyers from 
intentionally creating barriers to an opposing counsel’s access to evidence. 
III. FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(e) AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Before the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted, the practice in 
most federal courts was to require grand jury witnesses to take an oath of secrecy.60 
But Rule 6 expressly altered this common law practice when it was first enacted in 
1946. Rule 6(e)(2)(B) prohibits persons performing an “official function” before the 
grand jury (namely, the government lawyer, stenographer, recorder, interpreter, and 
jurors themselves) from disclosing what occurred before the grand jury, except as 
may be authorized by the court or other rules.61 But Rule 6(e)(2)(A) provides that 
“[n]o obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with 
Rule 6(e)(2)(B).”62 The Advisory Committee Note states that the express purpose of 
section (A) was to eliminate the common law practice of ordering secrecy on the part 
of grand jury witnesses. “The seal of secrecy on witnesses seems an unnecessary 
hardship and may lead to injustice if a witness is not permitted to make a disclosure 
to counsel or to an associate.”63 Like the federal courts, a majority of states now 
similarly exclude grand jury witnesses from any obligation of secrecy.64  
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1983). 
 58. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461–64 (9th Cir. 1993); State v. 
Miller, 600 N.W.2d 457, 462–64 (Minn. 1999).  
 59. Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1462 (emphasis in original). 
 60. See Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1939) (discussing practices 
among the states and federal districts, and concluding that “[i]t would seem to be well within 
the discretionary power of the court to impose an oath of secrecy not alone upon grand jurors, 
but upon the witnesses, if the court believes the precaution necessary in the investigation of 
crime”). 
 61. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B). 
 62. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(A). 
 63. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), advisory committee’s note 2 (1944).  
 64. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5. Nine states impose an obligation of secrecy 
on witnesses, but exempt communication between the witness and his attorney, and three 
impose an obligation of secrecy on witnesses without such an exemption. Compare ALA. CODE 
§§ 12-16-215, -216, -222 (LexisNexis 2012), and COLO. R. CRIM. P. 6.3, and FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 905.27(1), (3) (West 2014), and IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-34-2-5.5, -34-2-10(a) (2014), and 
KY. R. CRIM. P. 5.24(1), and LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 434(A), and MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 767.19f (West 2000 & Supp. 2015), and N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-623(e), (g) (West 
2009), and N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-10.1-30(4) (2006), with MISS. UNIF. R. CIR. AND CTY. CT. 
7.04, and MO. ANN. STAT. § 540.110 (West 2002), and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.27.090(3) 
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An early commentator on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Professor 
George Dession, wrote that under the new rules, “requiring witnesses before the 
grand jury to take an oath of secrecy is therefore no longer authorized, such 
restriction being considered impractical and unfair.”65 He quoted with approval 
Judge George Zerdin Medalie, also a member of the Advisory Committee: 
I know that some of the judges in some of the district courts have refused 
to administer such an oath, and have set themselves against punishment 
for contempt for breach of that oath, if taken. Others, however, have 
believed in that oath, and have enforced it by contempt orders. . . . It was 
impractical and unreal—a partner, an employee, a relative, a friend called 
on to testify will come back and tell the person concerning whom he 
testified, and it should be so.66 
A more direct statement of the intent behind the language of Rule 6(e)(2)(A) would 
be very difficult to imagine. 
The issue that has bedeviled the federal appeals courts is whether Rule 6(e) simply 
states a default position that certain persons appearing before the grand jury are 
automatically subject to a secrecy obligation and certain persons are not, or whether 
the rule further curtails the power of a court—even when presented with compelling 
circumstances—to issue an order of secrecy to a grand jury witness in the context of 
a particular case. Some courts have taken the former position, maintaining that courts 
have inherent authority to protect the integrity of the grand jury proceedings 
notwithstanding the express exemption in Rule 6(e) where disclosure of information 
would jeopardize the grand jury’s investigation.67 Other courts have ruled that the 
language “no obligation of secrecy may be imposed” is clear, and when coupled with 
                                                                                                                 
 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2015).  
 65. George H. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: II, 56 YALE L.J. 
197, 204 (1947) (footnote omitted).  
 66. Id. at 204 n.100 (citing Address by Medalie, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: WITH NOTES PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
APPOINTED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE 155 
(Alexander Holtzoff ed., 1946)).  
 67. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[C]ourts 
have inherent power, subject to the Constitution and federal statutes, to impose secrecy orders 
incident to matters occurring before them.”); In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury, 
864 F.2d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir. 1989) (upholding the district court’s discretion to enter order 
prohibiting the university from discussing subject matter of testimony before the grand jury or 
disclosing materials prepared in response to a grand jury subpoena); In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 797 F.2d 676, 680 (8th Cir. 1986) (“We therefore conclude that, 
upon a proper showing in an appropriate case, the district court may direct a grand jury witness 
to keep secret from targets of the investigation the existence of a subpoena, the nature of the 
documents subpoenaed, or testimony before the grand jury, for an appropriate period of 
time.”); In re Swearingen Aviation Corp., 486 F. Supp. 9, 11 (D. Md. 1979) (“In light of the 
court’s conclusions that it has supervisory powers over the grand jury and that Rule 6(e) is not 
an impediment to the issuance of the orders under the circumstances of this case, the court has 
the power under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to issue the orders involved.”). 
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the Advisory Committee note referenced above expressly limits the court’s authority 
to gag grand jury witnesses.68  
The latter position in this circuit split is the better interpretation of the two. The 
lower federal courts derive their powers from Congress.69 Although the Supreme 
Court has recognized that there are certain fundamental powers that are “inherent” 
to functioning as a court under Article III,70 the doctrine of inherent powers itself is 
a “shadowy” and “nebulous” concept.71 The Court has upheld a district court’s 
supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice,72 but “it has rejected 
attempts to invoke such power in defiance of positive federal law, either 
constitutional or statutory.”73 Where Congress has spoken directly on a particular 
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. See, e.g., United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 569 (10th Cir. 1976) (refusing to 
compel witness to testify before grand jury when foreman of grand jury had included in 
witness’s oath an obligation not to discuss the subject of his testimony: “We must agree the 
admonition to the witness is contrary to the provisions of Rule 6(e)”); In re Vescovo Special 
Grand Jury, 473 F. Supp. 1335, 1336 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (“Under Rule 6(e) no obligation of 
secrecy may be imposed upon grand jury witnesses. Witnesses may be interviewed after their 
appearance and repeat what they said before the grand jury or relate any knowledge they have 
on the subject of the inquiry.” (citations omitted)).  
 69. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) (“All federal courts, other than the 
Supreme Court, derive their jurisdiction wholly from the exercise of the authority to ‘ordain 
and establish’ inferior courts, conferred on Congress by Article III, § 1, of the Constitution.”). 
 70. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42–58 (1991) (upholding a court’s use of its 
inherent power to impose payment of attorney’s fees to sanction misconduct before it). 
 71. Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 72. See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: 
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
1433, 1433–34 (1984). 
 73. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural 
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 781 (2001) (footnotes omitted). Professor Pushaw argues 
that our constitutional structure and the fact that Article I contains a Necessary and Proper 
Clause while Article III does not suggests that the inherent powers doctrine should best be 
understood by recognizing two distinct categories of inherent judicial authority: (1) implied 
indispensable powers are those ancillary to actions that are absolutely essential to fulfill the 
Article III mandate to exercise “judicial power,” and (2) “beneficial” inherent powers are those 
that are merely helpful, useful, or convenient for federal judges. Id. at 741–43. Pushaw argues 
that Congress can restrict or even eliminate powers merely asserted for the sake of convenience 
or utility, for doing so does not seriously impair or destroy the Article III role. Id. at 834. 
“[F]ederal courts should defer to procedural and evidentiary statutes (or derivative rules), even 
if they would prefer a different legal standard, except in the rare instance where Congress has 
attempted to eliminate or impair an implied indispensable power.” Id. at 851. In Carlisle v. 
United States, the Supreme Court concluded that federal district courts lack “inherent 
supervisory power” to establish rules that regulate their own proceedings if that action 
circumvents or conflicts with express Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 517 U.S. 416, 
425–28 (1996) (finding that a court is without the power to entertain a motion for judgment of 
acquittal filed by the defendant one day late under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c)). 
“Whatever the scope of this ‘inherent power,’ however, it does not include the power to 
develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Id. 
at 426. 
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subject, a court’s inherent power is at its weakest.74 Powers that are “inherent” only 
in the sense that they are useful in the pursuit of a just result (such as gagging 
witnesses) may only be exercised in the absence of a contrary legislative directive.75 
Rule 6(e), approved by Congress pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, is just such a 
contrary legislative directive—the clear language of the rule (“no obligation may be 
imposed”) speaks to the power of the government, not the power of the witness. 
Several of the decisions that recognized the inherent authority of federal courts to 
gag grand jury witnesses were decided before the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in 
United States v. Williams.76 In Williams, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
resolve the issue of “[w]hether an indictment may be dismissed because the 
government failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.”77 The 
respondent argued that imposing such an obligation on prosecutors was mandated by 
the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of indictment by a grand jury for serious crimes, 
or in the alternative was authorized by the Tenth Circuit’s general supervisory power 
over the grand jury.78 The Court rejected both arguments, ruling that dismissal of a 
federal indictment due to the prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to 
the grand jury was improper.79 The majority concluded that a court’s power to 
regulate grand jury proceedings is not as broad as its supervisory power over its own 
proceedings.80 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reasoned that federal courts 
lack general supervisory power over the grand jury because grand juries are not 
“judicial” proceedings under Article III of the Constitution.81 Therefore, the Court 
proclaimed that the judiciary’s supervisory power over the grand jury should be 
limited to situations where the Constitution, a statute, or an express rule has been 
violated in the way the grand jury proceeding was conducted.82 Since the grand jury 
is not an Article III tribunal, after Williams a lower court has no inherent power to 
act to protect those proceedings.  
Moreover, some of the early federal court decisions that recognized the inherent 
authority of a district court to gag grand jury witnesses—notwithstanding a rule of 
criminal procedure that points precisely in the opposite direction—involved grand 
jury subpoenas for bank records.83 These decisions predated a crucial 1986 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) (rejecting court’s 
reliance on inherent authority to dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct in 
contravention of procedure set out in FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a)); Palermo v. United States, 360 
U.S. 343, 355–56 (1959) (upholding Jencks Act and Congress’s ability to limit the Court’s 
supervisory authority over prosecution’s disclosure of witness statements). 
 75. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562.  
 76. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).  
 77. Id. at 40. 
 78. Id. at 45. 
 79. Id. at 51. 
 80. Id. at 50.  
 81. Id. at 47. Justice Scalia relied on the fact that the grand jury is not mentioned in the 
body of the Constitution, but only in the Bill of Rights, to support his conclusion that it belongs 
to none of the three branches of government. Id. He also pointed both to the scope of the grand 
jury’s power, and to the manner in which it was exercised, to distinguish it from Article III 
courts. Id. at 48.  
 82. Id. at 46.  
 83. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.17. See also, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena 
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amendment to the Right to Financial Privacy Act.84 That Act provides for 
confidentiality of customer financial records and limits when and how they may be 
disseminated. When the statute was first enacted in 1978, it required financial 
institutions to notify customers if they turned over customer records in response to a 
subpoena.85 But grand jury subpoenas were expressly exempted from that provision 
of the Act.86 They were also exempted from a section of the Act that allowed 
prosecutors to request a court to order delay of notification for ninety days if there 
was reason to believe that such notice could result in flight, destruction of evidence, 
intimidation of a witness, and so forth.87 So banks were not required to notify their 
customers about grand jury subpoenas, but there was also no judicial mechanism for 
preventing them from doing so.88 In 1986, Congress resolved this ambiguity by 
passing an amendment that included grand jury subpoenas in the section of the Act 
authorizing the government to petition a court for delayed disclosure.89 This 
amendment makes clear that where Congress believes that grand jury investigations 
might be jeopardized by loose lips on the part of those who receive a subpoena, they 
know how to intervene.90 And such action would not have been needed with regard 
                                                                                                                 
 
Duces Tecum, 797 F.2d 676, 678–80 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Swearingen Aviation Corp., 486 
F. Supp. 9, 10–12 (D. Md. 1979).  
 84. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2012). See BEALE ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.17.  
 85. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3403–3407 (1982), amended by Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-570, § 1353(a), 100 Stat. 3207. 
 86. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(i) (1982), amended by Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-570, § 1353(b), 100 Stat. 3207. 
 87. 12 U.S.C. § 3409(a) (2012).  
 88. Because the old statute did not expressly prevent banks from notifying their clients 
that their accounts were subject to a subpoena, many federal prosecutors sought a court order 
at the time of issuance of the subpoena forbidding such notice. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 575 F. Supp. 1219, 1220–21 (E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Vescovo Special 
Grand Jury, 473 F. Supp. 1335, 1335–36 (C.D. Cal. 1979). That led to the rise of litigation and 
resulting circuit court split about whether federal courts had independent authority under Rule 
6(e) or the All Writs Act to order the delay of disclosure. See generally Norman A. Bloch, 
Gagging Bankers: Grand Jury Nondisclosure Statutes and the First Amendment, 107 
BANKING L.J. 441, 445–52 (1990) (discussing laws in effect at the time related to grand jury 
nondisclosure). 
 89. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1353(b), 100 Stat. 3207. In 1989, 
the statute was further amended to mandate secrecy (with no need to petition court for order) 
for grand jury subpoenas seeking financial records pertaining to certain crimes, including 
crimes against financial institutions, crimes under the Controlled Substance Act, money 
laundering, and IRS currency violations. See 12 U.S.C. § 3420(b) (2012).  
 90. Congress has also allowed the government to move for delayed disclosure of 
subpoenas for third-party records of electronic and wire communications. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2705(b) (2012). Delayed disclosure orders for document subpoenas do not implicate First 
Amendment concerns to the same extent as gag orders for fact witnesses. First and foremost, 
the limitation is temporary. Second, the limitation is on disclosing the fact that the record 
holder has been subpoenaed and the contents of the subpoena, rather than on disclosing 
underlying facts. Finally, where the target of the grand jury investigation is the account holder, 
he or she has access to the underlying information that is the subject of the subpoena. Delayed 
disclosure to the target that their records have been subpoenaed will not shield them from any 
information helpful in preparing their defense. Where the target of the potential investigation 
2016] SILENCING GRAND JURY WITNESSES 841 
 
to bank records under the Financial Privacy Act if federal courts retained independent 
authority to gag witnesses whenever they felt it necessary. 
Even if I am wrong and courts do retain some inherent authority to silence grand 
jury witnesses, they certainly cannot do so where such an order would violate the 
First Amendment.91 “[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content.”92 Prior restraints on speech are presumptively 
unconstitutional, 93 and the party moving for such a restriction bears a heavy burden 
of establishing that it is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.94 While 
the Supreme Court has recognized in dicta the authority of courts to gag trial 
witnesses in order to shield the petite jury from improper influence and protect the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial,95 even those orders may be entered 
only in extraordinary circumstances, and only after a detailed and compelling 
showing of potential prejudice.96 The state’s interests in protecting grand jury secrecy 
                                                                                                                 
 
is someone other than the account holder, the target would have no right to access that client’s 
account information even absent a court order.  
 91. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (“There is no force in 
respondent’s argument that the constitutional limitation[] . . . appl[ies] only to Congress . . . .”).  
 92. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (emphasis added) (quoting Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)) 
(remanding to the Third Circuit for determination whether the Child Online Protection Act 
survives strict scrutiny). 
 93. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978) (ruling that it is 
unconstitutional to prohibit a newspaper from publishing an article that accurately reported on 
an inquiry into judicial misconduct); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558–59, 570 
(1976) (striking down a gag order preventing the media from publishing any inculpatory 
details of an alleged murder or admissions made by the defendant pending the outcome of 
trial).  
 94. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549–51 (2012) (invalidating Stolen 
Valor Act); see also Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, No. 13–1499, slip op. at 6–7 (U.S. Apr. 
29, 2015) (resulting in five justices agreeing that strict scrutiny should be applied to judicial 
campaign speech). 
 95. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (“The courts must take such steps by 
rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences. 
Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement 
officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its 
function.” (emphasis added)). 
 96. Numerous appellate courts have reversed gag orders on trial witnesses on the grounds 
that those orders were entered prematurely and/or upon an inadequate showing of potential 
prejudice. See, e.g., Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. State, 596 S.E.2d 694, 696–97 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2004) (holding that the trial court failed to apply the requisite legal standard before 
imposing a gag order directed at witnesses and others); State ex rel. Missoulian v. Mont. 
Twenty-First Judicial Dist. Court, Ravalli Cnty., 933 P.2d 829, 841 (Mont. 1997) (reversing 
order and remanding for further proceedings because the court below did not make “specific 
findings that there is a substantial probability that the defendant’s right to a fair trial will be 
prejudiced by publicity that the gag order would otherwise prevent” (emphasis in original)); 
State ex. rel. NBC v. Court of Common Pleas, 556 N.E.2d 1120, 1124 (Ohio 1990) (per 
curiam) (prohibiting the enforcement of a gag order due to lack of specific, on the record 
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is both different from, and less compelling than, its interest in promoting fairness in 
the ultimate criminal trial.  
In Butterworth v. Smith,97 the Supreme Court struck down a Florida statute that 
prohibited a grand jury witness from ever disclosing his testimony before that body.98 
A reporter who testified before the grand jury about alleged improprieties at the 
county sheriff’s and state attorney’s offices later sought to write a book about the 
subject of his grand jury testimony after the panel had terminated its investigation 
into public corruption without indictment.99 The reporter unsuccessfully sought a 
declaration before the district court that the Florida grand jury statute was an 
unconstitutional abridgement of speech, as well as an injunction preventing the State 
from prosecuting him under it.100 The Supreme Court agreed with the Eleventh 
Circuit that such a blanket and indefinite prohibition on a grand jury witness from 
ever disclosing the contents of his testimony to the grand jury violated the First 
Amendment.101 Without expressly deciding what level of compelling interest was 
necessary to justify a prior restraint on a person not a party to a judicial proceeding,102 
the Court ruled that none of the state’s purported interests in grand jury secrecy, taken 
individually or collectively, were compelling enough to save Florida’s statute from 
constitutional infirmity.103 “[T]he invocation of grand jury interests is not ‘some 
                                                                                                                 
 
findings demonstrating that order is “essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly 
tailored to serve that interest” (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 
510 (1984))). Courts disagree whether the appropriate constitutional standard that must be met 
before imposing gag orders on trial witnesses is “clear and present danger” or the less stringent 
“substantial likelihood of prejudice.” David D. Smyth III, A New Framework for Analyzing 
Gag Orders Against Trial Witnesses, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 89, 93, 102 (2004) (arguing for “clear 
and present danger” standard). Compare United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 598–99 (6th Cir. 
1987), with United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 428 (5th Cir. 2000). There is some 
suggestion in Supreme Court precedent that courts may impose gag orders on parties to the 
proceeding and their lawyers, upon a lesser showing of substantial likelihood of material 
prejudice, because they have obligations towards the tribunal that the court may properly 
regulate. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1057 (1991) (opinion of Kennedy, J.).  
 97. 494 U.S. 624 (1990). 
 98. FLA. STAT. § 905.27 (1989).  
 99. Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 628. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 636.  
 102. The parties in Butterworth urged the Court to apply differing First Amendment 
standards for prior restraints on speech. The respondent urged the Court to adopt a “clear and 
present danger” standard, as applied in Landmark Communications. 435 U.S. at 845 (holding 
unconstitutional a state statue making it a crime to divulge information from proceedings 
before a state judicial review commission). The petitioner urged the Court to uphold the 
restriction on speech of participants in a pending judicial proceeding so long as those 
restrictions advanced a substantial governmental interest and were no broader than necessary 
to advance those interests. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33–34 (1984) (holding 
that a protective order prohibiting a newspaper from publishing information which it had 
obtained through discovery procedures as the defendant in a defamation suit did not offend 
the First Amendment). In striking down the Florida grand jury statute as applied to respondent, 
the Court in Butterworth did not choose between those two standards, or adopt an alternative.  
 103. Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 633–35.  
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talisman that dissolves all constitutional protections.’”104 The Court examined the 
five interests purportedly served by grand jury secrecy that it had previously 
acknowledged in Douglas Oil Co. of California v. Petrol Stops Northwest.105 The 
Court reasoned that three of these interests—namely, preventing target flight, 
preventing the importuning of grand jurors, and protecting prospective witnesses 
from being pressured in their testimony—were irrelevant once the grand jury had 
terminated its inquiry and been discharged.106 Two interests were relevant, but were 
deemed by the Court “insufficient to outweigh the First Amendment interest in 
speech involved.”107 While Florida’s interest in preventing the subornation of perjury 
at trial continues beyond indictment, the Court noted that most modern criminal 
discovery rules provide the accused with notice of the government’s witnesses 
against him prior to trial, and therefore grand jury secrecy provisions do little to 
shelter trial witnesses from pressure or intimidation.108 The Court acknowledged that 
the Florida statute protected exonerated individuals from having unproven 
allegations exposed to the public, but “absent exceptional circumstances, 
reputational interests alone cannot justify the proscription of truthful speech.”109 The 
Court also noted approvingly that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) and its 
analogues in many states do not impose any obligation of secrecy on grand jury 
witnesses: “While these practices are not conclusive as to the constitutionality of 
Florida’s rule, they are probative of the weight to be assigned Florida’s asserted 
interests and the extent to which the prohibition in question is necessary to further 
them.”110 The reporter-witness in Butterworth was thus free to publish information 
in his possession about alleged improprieties by county officials, insofar as they were 
facts “he was in possession [of] before” the grand jury investigation111 and/or 
involved “his own testimony”112 before the grand jury. The Court held that “insofar 
as the Florida law prohibits a grand jury witness from disclosing his own testimony 
after the term of the grand jury has ended, it violates the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.” 113  
There are at least three possible ways to read the Butterworth decision. One 
reading suggests that the Florida statute was overbroad because it barred grand jury 
witnesses indefinitely from revealing or discussing the contents of their testimony. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 104. Id. at 630 (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973)). 
 105. Id. at 632–35 (discussing Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211 
(1979)). See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 106. Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 632–33. The concern that some witnesses will be deterred 
from testifying if they know that their testimony may later be revealed is inapplicable, since 
grand jury witnesses remain free to choose not to disclose their own testimony, and the 
respondent did not challenge the statute’s prohibition insofar as it prevented the somewhat 
unusual circumstance of one grand jury witness from being able to reveal the identity or 
testimony of another. Id. at 633.  
 107. Id. at 634. 
 108. Id. at 633.  
 109. Id. at 634.  
 110. Id. at 635. 
 111. Id. at 632. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 626.  
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This suggests that a narrower prohibition, limited temporally to the length of the 
grand jury’s inquiry, might survive constitutional scrutiny. This reading has been 
adopted by the Tenth Circuit.114 Another reading of Butterworth, espoused by Justice 
Scalia in his concurring opinion, is that witnesses can never be prohibited from 
discussing facts to which they were called upon to testify before the grand jury, 
provided that the witness has an independent source for those facts, but that the 
witness may be barred, even permanently, from discussing what actually occurred 
during the grand jury proceeding.115 This reading is supported by the language in 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion distinguishing Rhinehart, where the 
Court stated, “[h]ere, by contrast, we deal only with respondent’s right to divulge 
information of which he was in possession before he testified before the grand jury, 
and not information which he may have obtained as a result of his participation in 
the proceedings of the grand jury.”116 This construction of Butterworth has been 
adopted by the First Circuit and several other courts.117 The narrowest possible 
reading of Butterworth is that a grand jury witness at most may be barred from 
publicizing what actually transpired in the grand jury room (that is, questions that 
were asked, exhibits that were referenced), and only for the life of that inquiry.118 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. See Hoffmann-Pugh v. Keenan, 338 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2003) (involving the 
housekeeper for the family of JonBenet Ramsey who sought declaratory judgment that a 
Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure was unconstitutional because it prohibited her from 
writing a book about her experience before a grand jury during a murder investigation; the 
Tenth Circuit ruled that the Colorado rule was narrower than the Florida statute at issue in 
Butterworth because it prohibited only the disclosure of “grand jury testimony” unless and 
until an indictment had been returned or a grand jury report had been issued). 
 115. Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 636–37 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 116. Id. at 632 (majority opinion). See id. at 635 (“After giving his testimony, respondent 
believes he is no longer free to communicate this information since it relates to the ‘content, 
gist or import’ of his testimony.”). 
 117. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2005) (regarding 
a motion to compel an attorney witness to testify before a grand jury despite a claim of 
attorney-client privilege, the government sought an order forbidding the attorney “from 
disclosing to anyone . . . what he had been asked in the grand jury or other information 
pertaining to ‘the subject matter’ of the grand jury inquiry”; the First Circuit determined that 
it was “the permanency of the ban that most troubled the Supreme Court” in Butterworth, and 
allowed the gag order on the condition that the attorney witness could petition the district court 
for a termination of the order whenever the need for it disappeared); In re Catfish Antitrust 
Litigation, 164 F.R.D. 191, 192–93 n.2 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (imposing Rule 6(e) secrecy 
obligations on witnesses would violate the First Amendment, “at least after the grand jury 
proceedings have concluded”); cf. Doe v. Doe, 127 S.W.3d 728, 736 (Tenn. 2004) (explaining 
that in the context of attorney disciplinary proceedings, “[t]o the extent that Disciplinary 
Counsel serves a function analogous to a grand jury, we agree with the Attorney General that 
confidentiality furthers a legitimate state interest in maintaining the integrity of pending 
investigations. We do not believe, however, that this interest—even if it were considered to be 
compelling—warrants a permanent ban on disclosure of information”).  
 118. In Butterworth, Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that a state may not prohibit a 
witness from discussing facts within his independent knowledge (at least after the term of the 
grand jury’s inquiry has ended), but he considered it “[q]uite a different question” whether the 
state may prohibit a witness from revealing that he told the grand jury those very same facts. 
Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring). That fine distinction is contrary to the 
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The latter approach seems to me to be most consistent with First Amendment values. 
With respect to matters of public concern, a witness before the grand jury should never 
be prohibited from talking to the media about facts within his own knowledge, even 
during the pendency of grand jury proceedings, because political speech lies at the 
heart of First Amendment protection.119 Prior to an indictment—which may or may 
not be forthcoming—there are simply no countervailing Sixth Amendment rights to 
a fair trial that must be balanced against the right to free speech.120 Empowering the 
prosecutor or the court to silence a witness from talking about what they know would 
allow law enforcement to squelch information about government misconduct simply 
by serving a grand jury subpoena on those persons holding relevant information. In 
hypothetical two, posed at the beginning of this Article, the mother of the senator’s 
child has every right to tell (and to sell) her story about her extramarital affair with a 
prominent public official, and the government cannot prevent her from doing so 
simply by launching a grand jury inquiry. 
The benefits to the public of enabling grand jury witnesses to talk to the press 
during the pendency of a criminal investigation should not be underestimated, and 
                                                                                                                 
 
majority opinion, where Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the reporter was free to 
publish information about “his own testimony” before the grand jury. Id. at 632 (majority 
opinion). It also impresses me as an irrelevant one for constitutional purposes. Witnesses may 
wish to make known to the media that they testified to a certain fact or set of facts before the 
grand jury, in order to criticize government inaction. This occurred in the investigation into 
the choking death of Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York; bystander Ramsey Orta told the 
media that he had described the videotaped arrest of Garner in great detail to the grand jury, 
but that they seemed disinterested. See Badia et al., supra note 21. This is legitimate public 
discourse about a matter central to the conduct of government; that is, the independence of the 
grand jury and its continued utility in our criminal justice system. I disagree with Justice 
Scalia’s suggestion that there may be “quite good reasons” why the state would want such 
information to be kept confidential, so that “grand jurors will not be intimidated in the 
execution of their duties by fear of . . . criticism to which they cannot respond.” Butterworth, 
494 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring). First, the law is replete with instances in which a 
government actor’s reply to speech is curtailed, even though the speaker has a First 
Amendment right to make his point (the possession of classified information is but one 
example). Second, the identity of grand jurors is not public information, but the identity of 
trial jurors typically is. See Scott Sholder, “What’s In a Name?”: A Paradigm Shift from 
Press-Enterprise to Time, Place and Manner Restrictions When Considering the Release of 
Juror-Identifying Information in Criminal Trials, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 97, 99–100 (2009) 
(noting a trend in case law toward allowing press access to juror identities after the verdict). 
Individual grand jurors are unlikely to be intimidated in the execution of their duties by the 
public revelation of what evidence has been presented to them because they know that their 
individual identities will not be revealed. 
 119. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978). In Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he press . . . guards against the miscarriage of 
justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny 
and criticism.” 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966). 
 120. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1044 (1991) (stating that the timing 
of pretrial disclosure is “crucial in the assessment of possible prejudice”); Patton v. Yount, 
467 U.S. 1025, 1032–35 (1984) (finding that a lapse in time between pretrial publicity and 
jury selection was relevant to determining whether the Sixth Amendment right to impartial 
jury was violated).  
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can be seen by the varying reactions to the police-involved killings in Ferguson, 
Missouri and Staten Island, New York.121 In Ferguson, several eyewitnesses saw 
Officer Darren Wilson being assaulted by Michael Brown in his police cruiser, and 
heard Officer Wilson order Brown to stop before he fired the fatal shots.122 While 
certainly not uncontroverted, these witnesses supported a theory of justified force, 
yet they were not allowed to talk publicly during the grand jury proceedings. Citizens 
in Ferguson thus did not have an accurate picture of the full state of the evidence and 
felt frustrated by the lack of police accountability. Had witnesses been liberated from 
the shackles of Missouri Revised Statute section 540.100,123 some versions of events 
otherwise undisclosed may have countered, if not quieted, public criticism of the 
police department—and maybe even have fended off violent riots and arson. In 
Staten Island, by contrast, witnesses to the arrest of Eric Garner spoke frequently and 
passionately about his violent arrest to the media during the investigation.124 This 
open and honest discourse about Garner’s chokehold death may have led to an 
environment where members of the public who were dissatisfied with law 
enforcement at least felt that there was a nonviolent way for their voices to be heard.  
Even on matters not so directly of public concern, subjects and witnesses in a 
criminal investigation have a fundamental due process interest125 in sharing 
information with each other. If a prosecutor can silence grand jury witnesses from 
talking about the facts of the case by requesting gag orders as part of immunity 
                                                                                                                 
 
 121. See Eric Garner Case: Why Weren’t Protests as Violent as in Ferguson?, CBS NEWS 
(December 5, 2014, 7:03 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/eric-garner-case-why-werent
-protests-as-violent-as-in-ferguson/ [https://perma.cc/RR5X-HL6C] (describing New York 
protests as “mostly peaceful”). 
 122. Alberto Cuadra, Lazaro Gamio, Kimbriell Kelly & Scott Higham, Chaos in a Police 
Vehicle, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special
/national/ferguson-reconstruction/ [https://perma.cc/A5ET-CX7X]; Eric Eckholm, Witnesses 
Told Grand Jury That Michael Brown Charged at Darren Wilson, Prosecutor Says, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/witnesses-told-grand-jury
-that-michael-brown-charged-at-darren-wilson-prosecutor-says.html [https://perma.cc/6RSP
-UXXY]; Michael S. Schmidt, Matt Apuzzo & Julia Bosman, Police Officer in Ferguson Is 
Said to Recount a Struggle, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014
/10/18/us/ferguson-case-officer-is-said-to-cite-struggle.html [https://perma.cc/26BC-Q7XJ]. 
 123. MO. ANN. STAT. § 540.110 (West 2002). 
 124. Laura Ly, Can Cell Phones Stop Police Brutality?, CNN (Nov. 19, 2014, 5:31 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/18/us/police-cell-phone-videos/ [https://perma.cc/5H9H-5VE6]; 
Ashley Southall & Marc Santora, Remembering a Man Whose Death Made Him a Symbol of 
a Divide, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/nyregion/mans
-dying-words-in-police-custody-become-rallying-cry-before-his-funeral.html [https://perma.cc
/DXK6-8ET5]. 
 125. The “fundamental fairness” theory of due process prohibits a prosecutor from 
obstructing the defendant’s access to evidence in a criminal case. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 
488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (concerning the use of fundamental fairness as it relates to the police’s 
failure to preserve items seized prior to arrest for forensic testing); see also Coppolino v. 
Helpern, 266 F. Supp. 930, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (“[A]s to interviewing a prospective 
prosecution witness, our constitutional notions of fair play and due process dictate that defense 
counsel be free from obstruction, whether it come from the prosecutor in the case or from a 
state official of another state acting under color of law”). 
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applications, they can frustrate the ability of subjects of the grand jury investigation 
to collect evidence and conduct witness interviews of their own. Especially in the 
context of corporate and white-collar crime, witnesses often need to enlist the help 
of colleagues to recall events, to identify other persons with knowledge of a particular 
subject, and to locate and preserve documents. Such collaboration is essential to the 
defense counsel’s critical role during an investigation of presenting the prosecutor 
with exculpatory evidence126 so that the grand jury can be allowed to perform its core 
function as a “shield” 127 against unfounded prosecution.  
The recent murder and racketeering charges stemming from a brawl between rival 
motorcycle gangs at the Twin Peaks restaurant in Waco, Texas, illustrate the dangers 
of the government attempting to overreach and silence ordinary witnesses to a 
crime.128 After a melee that left nine people dead, the police arrested 177 suspects.129 
Within days of their arrest, the district attorney moved for an order gagging “all 
attorneys, their staffs, law enforcement officers, and witnesses who had provided 
statements to law enforcement” from talking to the media about the altercation at 
Twin Peaks.130 The judge presiding at a bail hearing granted the gag order proposed 
by the State, which was drafted by McClennan County District Attorney Abel Renya, 
the judge’s former law partner.131 Not coincidentally, the State’s gag request came 
just one day after the State was served with a subpoena from an arrested suspect 
requesting production of the restaurant’s videotape of the incident.132 The defense 
                                                                                                                 
 
 126. See Coopersmith & Herd, supra note 55, at 37–38. The United States Attorneys’ 
Manual urges federal prosecutors to disclose to the grand jury “substantial evidence that 
directly negates the guilt of a subject of the investigation.” OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-11.233 (1997). 
 127. See Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional 
Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265, 1266–67 (2006). 
 128. See Brief of Amici Curiae the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 15 
Media Organizations in Support of Relator’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In re 
Clendennen, No. 10-15-00235-CR, 2015 BL 254662 (Tex. Crim. App. July 24, 2015); Tommy 
Witherspoon, Judge Prevents Public Release of Twin Peaks Video, Issues Gag Order, WACO 
TRIB. (June 30, 2015, 12:57 PM), http://www.wacotrib.com/news/twin-peaks-biker-shooting
/judge-prevents-public-release-of-twin-peaks-video-issues-gag/article_37bd518d-0c6b-52f8
-9374-d573e366f05b.html [https://perma.cc/PW8M-VVPQ]. 
 129. Kelly McEvers, Texas Bikers Arrested After Waco Shootout Say They Are Innocent, 
NPR (July 7, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/07/420824592/texas-bikers
-arrested-after-waco-shootout-say-they-are-innocent [https://perma.cc/7SZY-PXH7]; Michael 
E. Miller, In the Wake of Deadly Waco Biker Shootout, Guns, Knives, Clubs, Chains, but Few 
Answers, WASH. POST (May 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix
/wp/2015/05/21/in-the-wake-of-deadly-waco-biker-shootout-hundreds-of-weapons-but-few
-answers/ [https://perma.cc/RRY5-38Z7]. 
 130. Order Prohibiting Attorneys, Law Enforcement and Witnesses from Discussing Case 
with the Media, State v. Clendennen, No. 2015-1955-2 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 30, 2015). 
 131. Emily Schmall & Jim Vertuno, Biker Challenges Judge’s Gag Order in Criminal 
Cases, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 1, 2015, 9:12 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article
/df7ac00d1ed0482981181e7a9fcdf5ea/biker-challenges-judges-gag-order-criminal-case 
[https://perma.cc/MDT4-SFE6]. 
 132. Order Prohibiting Attorneys, Law Enforcement and Witnesses from Discussing Case 
with the Media, supra note 130; Lana Shadwick, Waco Judge Stops Twin Peaks Video Release, 
Issues Gag Order, BREITBART (June 1, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/texas/2015
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speculates that the district attorney requested the gag order in part to prevent 
dissemination of a videotape that the State had in its possession and would be using 
to prepare the government’s case and present charges.133 The Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth District ruled that this gag order was an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court and a violation of petitioner’s free speech rights under applicable Texas 
precedent.134 The gag order is now up for consideration by the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals.135 
After Butterworth, I suspect that at least some of the approaches taken by the 
twelve states that extend their oath of grand jury secrecy to witnesses might not 
withstand a First Amendment challenge, depending upon how precisely those 
statutes are drawn and the exact nature of the speech prohibited.136 But my focus in 
this Part has been on the federal system and the thirty-six states that do not include 
witnesses in their oaths of grand jury secrecy. In those jurisdictions, courts should 
decline an invitation to gag grand jury witnesses by supplemental order, for two 
primary reasons: 1) the court does not have “inherent authority” to do so, and 2) there 
are substantial doubts whether such a gag order would survive First Amendment 
scrutiny. In extraordinary circumstances if a court ever believes that grand jury leaks 
might jeopardize public safety or national security,137 the most that a court has the 
                                                                                                                 
 
/07/01/waco-judge-stops-twin-peaks-video-release-issues-gag-order/ [https://perma.cc
/J8UG-E73S]. 
 133. See Witherspoon, supra note 128.  
 134. In re Clendennen, No. 10-15-0023-CR, 2015 BL 254662, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 
7, 2015) (citing In re Graves, 217 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. App. 2007). 
 135. Order Granting Relator’s Motion to Stay, State v. Clendennen, No. WR-83, 719-01 
(Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 13, 2015).  
 136. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 35-34-2-4(i) (2015) (“Grand jury proceedings shall be 
secret, and no person present during a grand jury proceeding may, except in the lawful 
discharge of his duties or upon written order of the court impaneling the grand jury or the court 
trying the case on indictment presented by the grand jury, disclose: (1) the nature or substance 
of any grand jury testimony; or (2) any decision, result, or other matter attending the grand 
jury proceeding.”) (emphasis added), with N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-10.1-30(4) (2006) (“A 
witness may not disclose any matter about which the witness is interrogated, or any 
proceedings of the grand jury had in the witness’s presence, except to the witness’s attorney 
or when so directed by the court, until an indictment is filed and the accused person is in 
custody.”) (emphasis added).  
 137. Although a discussion of national-security investigations is beyond the scope of this 
Article, my recommendations in this Article are unlikely to hinder counterterrorism 
investigations because federal statutes contain quite specific rules pertaining to secrecy in the 
national security context that are broader than Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). For a 
comprehensive analysis of the wide variety of tools available to the government to keep the 
nature, scope, and content of national-security investigations confidential, see Nathan 
Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National Security Investigations, 58 ALA. L. REV. 811, 838–65 
(2007). For example, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) allows the government 
to conduct electronic surveillance, employ pen registers, seize physical evidence, and demand 
business records upon approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 50 U.S.C. §§ 
1801–1861 (2012). All four FISA subchapters contain secrecy requirements that impose 
confidentiality obligations upon the recipients of those subpoenas or court orders. Sales, supra 
at 871. The FBI also has the power to issue “National Security Letters” under the USA Patriot 
Act to obtain records of third-party providers regarding stored electronic communications and 
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power to do is to order the witness not to reveal to anyone what actually transpired 
in the grand jury room (that is, specific questions that were asked by the prosecutor 
or by a grand juror). A trial court may never order a grand jury witness not to discuss 
with others or with the media facts that the witness disclosed to the grand jury that 
were known by him or her independently of the grand jury investigation. 
CONCLUSION 
One important but often overlooked issue in the grand jury transparency debate is 
the ability of witnesses to talk to each other and to the media about the contents of 
their testimony. Witnesses often mistakenly conclude that the shroud of grand jury 
secrecy extends to them when in most jurisdictions it simply does not. Prosecutors 
sometimes seek to capitalize on this ignorance by affirmatively instructing the 
witness to remain silent, either informally in their instructions to the witness or more 
formally in a written plea agreement or judicial immunity application. Counsel 
representing witnesses before the grand jury should push back against such efforts, 
on the grounds that they offend the Rules of Professional Conduct, the intent behind 
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the First Amendment. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 
financial transactions. See 12 U.S.C. § 3414 (2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u, 1681v (2012); 18 
U.S.C. § 2709 (2012). The government may order recipients of a National Security Letter to 
keep the receipt and content of the letter private whenever an FBI Director or his designee 
certifies that disclosure may result in a national security threat or damage an ongoing 
investigation. See Michael German, Michelle Richardson, Valerie Caproni & Steven Siegel, 
National Security Letters: Building Blocks for Investigations or Intrusive Tools?, A.B.A. J. 
(Sept. 1, 2012, 10:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/national_security
_letters_building_blocks_for_investigations_or_intrusive_t/ [https://perma.cc/3LX8-9Z92]. 
One interesting development for the purposes of this Article is that two federal courts have 
ruled that the nondisclosure provisions of the National Security Letter statutes offend the First 
Amendment. Compare Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 883 (2d Cir. 2008) (enjoining the 
government from enforcing those provisions of the National Security Letter statutes that 
placed the burden on the recipient to contest nondisclosure order, and that allowed government 
to meet its burden in said judicial proceedings through “conclusive” certification by senior 
government official), with In re National Security Letter, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1081 (N.D. 
Cal. 2013) (finding nondisclosure provisions unconstitutional and nonseverable, enjoining 
issuance of National Security Letters altogether), appeal filed. These two National Security 
Letter decisions strongly support my argument: if a witness “gag” order fails to promote a 
compelling state interest in the national security context, it is highly unlikely to survive First 
Amendment scrutiny in a routine criminal investigation, especially where the witness is a fact 
witness rather than a third-party record holder. 
